Out from the shadows : The run on shadow banking and a framework for reform by Renee Courtois Haltom
O
ne reason the recent financial crisis caught many
regulators and economists off guard is that the
problems arose in a sector of financial activity
which existed largely outside of view. A narrative that’s
catching on in academic and policy circles is that much of
the financial crisis was a garden-variety bank run, in which
many depositors withdraw at once, rendering a bank insol-
vent. Only this run occurred in the “shadow” banking sector,
which before the crisis many people didn’t traditionally
think of as banking and therefore didn’t appreciate its sus-
ceptibility to runs. 
That’s because the primary actors were not commercial
banks. The shadow banking system performs a role similar
to traditional banks — credit intermediation, or connecting
lenders and borrowers — except the lenders and borrowers
are large businesses, broker-dealers, and institutional
investors with millions or billions to invest and lend at a
time. Also, like traditional banking, much of the credit inter-
mediation in the shadow banking system takes the form of
maturity transformation — issuing short-term, liquid liabili-
ties against longer-term, less liquid assets.
The traditional banks patronized by households and
businesses are backed by federal deposit insurance and have
access to liquidity from the Fed. Both backstops help 
prevent bank runs and make the system relatively stable.
Because government support may weaken market discipline,
banks are also regulated, which supports that stability. 
Shadow banking activities, on the other hand, faced no
explicit government support and no safety and soundness
regulation before the crisis. Runs on the system occurred in
2008 when “depositors” withdrew their funding from
“banks.”
Because of the havoc that followed, the term “shadow
banking” now has a generally negative connotation. Yet it
remains a vital component of the financial system. The 
shadow banking system may have exceeded $20 trillion in
liabilities at its peak, possibly doubling that of the tradi-
tional, regulated banking system. Today it stands somewhere
around $15 trillion. Shadow banking is critical because it
funds the traditional banking sector by purchasing loans
from bank balance sheets. This allows banks to shed risk and
extend additional credit. Without shadow banking, tradi-
tional banking likely would be much costlier for households
and businesses.
And the system generally operates well — until there’s a
crisis. If the sector breaks down, it can constrict the flow of
credit until it risks bringing the economy down with it. The
recent financial crisis has led to a far greater understanding
of the weaknesses posed by the system and the opportuni-
ties for making it more sound, but reform still has far to go.
Banking’s Crawl to the Shadows
According to Yale University economist Gary Gorton, a
leading researcher on the development and operation of the
shadow banking system, banking’s crawl to the shadows
occurred over three or four decades as financial markets 
and regulators adjusted to accommodate an increasingly
dynamic economy. This was marked by at least three trends.
The first change, according to Gorton, was that tradi-
tional banking became less profitable. Banks were restricted
from paying interest on demand deposits. In the high inter-
est rate environment of the late 1970s and 1980s, banks
faced increasing competition from interest-bearing services
offered by nonbanks such as money market mutual funds.
Meanwhile, banks also were prohibited from exotic services
such as insurance and securities underwriting. The bank
charter grew less valuable relative to other types of financial
business.
Banks found a way to finance themselves that was much
more profitable than deposit taking and its associated costly
regulatory requirements. They securitized the loans they
made and sold them to eager investors, which shifted assets
and associated risks off their balance sheets. Securitization
was such a successful innovation that even nonbanks, like
large corporations that issue credit cards or auto loans, 
used it. 
The second change Gorton notes is the explosion of
institutional investing, including pension funds, mutual
funds, and insurance companies. “These guys are sitting on
mountains of cash — that is, in the course of their business,
everything is not invested 100 percent of the time,” Gorton
says. Even nonfinancial corporations, the Microsofts and
Boeings of the world, have large treasury departments that
hold cash to pay bills and payrolls — so they can’t tie it up in
investments but need a safe, short-term place to hold it.
“Essentially they need a checking account,” he says. But the
prohibition of interest on demand deposits made the tradi-
tional banking sector a poor choice as a place to park those
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 large sums, and their balances would well exceed limits on
deposit insurance, today set at $250,000. This trend created
a demand for safe, short-term investments.
And that led to a growing demand for collateral — the
third change Gorton notes — to add safety to investments
outside the insured and regulated banking sector. Collateral,
or treasuries and high-grade bonds, acts like currency in the
market for funds. Institutions are able to borrow large sums
to fund operations because they set aside collateral that the
lender takes ownership of in the event of default. Collateral
makes shadow lending safe, in theory, much like deposit
insurance does for commercial banking. Derivatives alone
required about $4 trillion in collateral by the end of 2008,
according to the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, and many other forms of private borrowing are
also backed by collateral. That means no one really knows
for sure how much collateral the modern financial system
requires to function. What we do know is there is a large
demand for safe, liquid securities to act as collateral. 
The supply of collateral eventually grew to meet that
demand. As shadow banking grew, and foreign governments
acquired greater amounts of U.S. Treasury debt, highly rated
securitized assets like mortgage-related securities and col-
lateralized debt obligations stepped in as instruments of
collateral.
These three trends, Gorton says, produced the shadow
banking sector that existed before the crisis. Shadow bank-
ing essentially creates a checking account for large
institutions, and in that sense it is money creation, just like
households’ checking accounts. In fact, the Fed used to
count some shadow banking instruments as money in M3,
the broadest measure of the money supply. The Fed stopped
measuring M3 in 2006 because the costs of tracking all that
complex, private activity exceeded the minimal benefit it
provided to the conduct of monetary policy.
The Repo Market
A major instrument in shadow banking is repurchase agree-
ments or “repos,” a type of short-term loan. Here’s how a
repo contract works: I agree to lend you $100 for a set peri-
od of time, often just one day. You use the $100 to make
investments or pay off other liabilities, and in the meantime
you give me a set of bonds — perhaps highly rated credit
card or mortgage securitizations — with a market value of
$102 as collateral. The extra $2 provides a small buffer, called
a haircut, in case you’re unable to pay the loan back and I
have trouble reselling the bonds to recover my funds. The
harder it would be to unload the collateral on the market,
the greater the haircut I would require. After the period
expires, I give you back the collateral, and you give me back
the $100 plus interest — although many repo lenders simply
“roll” their investment each day and stay invested. Repos are
much like a demand deposit, which can be withdrawn at any
time, so repo lenders are “depositors” in the shadow banking
system.
The size of the repo market is staggering. One large com-
ponent is the “tri-party” repo market, in which repos are
funneled through one of two national clearing banks,
JPMorgan and BNY Mellon. These clearing banks report
that the largest lenders individually provided more than
$100 billion daily before the crisis. At the peak the tri-party
market financed a monthly average of $2.8 trillion in assets.
The market is relatively thin: The top 10 cash borrowers
account for 85 percent of tri-party repo volume, and the top
10 lenders provide about 65 percent of the funds invested.
Institutions would regularly borrow $100 billion in the tri-
party repo market, sometimes as much as $400 billion.
Many borrowers were highly leveraged. Investment bank
Lehman Brothers, for example, maintained $700 billion of
assets and corresponding liabilities on capital of about $25
billion. A large portion of those assets were long-term
investments that could not easily be sold if cash were 
needed, yet Lehman, like others, chose to fund them largely
through short-term repo markets since copious demand for
short-term investments made that funding source cheap. In
2008 Lehman would sometimes roll over $200 billion of its
balance sheet each day in repos. 
Many market participants also use repos that are not 
funneled through any common intermediary (called simply
“bilateral” repos). “Almost nothing is known about this
whole market,” Gorton says, so there is no way to know for
sure how big the repo market ultimately became. His best
estimate, based on existing knowledge of various corners of
financial activity, is that the total repo market may have
grown as large as $12 trillion, a couple trillion larger than the
traditional banking sector.
Fixing the Run on Repo
How was the breakdown of repo markets like a bank run?
Repo lenders face a daily decision to roll over the investment
— that is, to not “withdraw” their funds from the shadow
banking system. The more repo lenders withdraw, the more
likely the borrower is to become insolvent and default, leav-
ing lenders with the collateral. Yet if repo lenders begin to
not want or trust the collateral, their version of deposit
insurance, they’ll be more likely to withdraw their invest-
ment. If this self re-enforcing cycle escalates, lenders have
no choice but to withdraw or risk being the last one standing
and holding potentially devalued collateral.
Here’s how this played out during the fall of 2008: On
rumors of severe housing exposure and potential failure,
Lehman Brothers’ counterparties refused to roll over the
investments that funded its operations. This created a panic.
Investors were uncertain which large institutions — many of
which they or their counterparties had extended loans to —
could face a funding crisis next. Yet mounting subprime
defaults also made investors doubt the value of the collateral
that was supposed to make them whole. Repo lenders began
requiring larger and larger haircuts as insurance. Repo bor-
rowers were forced to sell other assets in order to provide
the haircuts. As the panic wore on, more and more assets
were sold and their prices dropped, requiring the borrowers
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to sell still more, dropping their prices further. Collateral
became worth less and less until repo lenders stopped lend-
ing entirely. That took away a major ultimate funding source
for virtually all types of economic activity, all within a 
matter of days.
The run was stemmed when the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Treasury
stepped in to provide short-term loans through a variety of
liquidity facilities. Through the course of the crisis these
facilities were targeted to a number of shadow banking mar-
kets in addition to repo. The shadow banking system has
contracted by $5 trillion since the crisis (see chart), estimate
a group of New York Fed researchers, but they and many
others argue that official lending drastically reduced the
negative effect on the economy, which otherwise may have
gone into an even deeper recession. 
The run on repo markets was no different than the bank
runs modeled 30 years ago by economists Doug Diamond
and Philip Dybvig, says Morgan Ricks, a former hedge fund
trader and U.S. Treasury employee who currently teaches at
Harvard Law School. Their model’s innovation was to show
how the banking system can be subject to runs even if all
actors are fully rational and informed, an instability the gov-
ernment can cure by insuring deposits. If there is a similar
fundamental instability in repo markets, an important con-
sideration for policymakers is the extent to which that
market requires some kind of government support in order
to remain stable. 
The key for repo markets, according to Gorton, is to 
recognize that safe, liquid collateral functions like deposit
insurance for repo lenders. To create those conditions, 
collateral needs to be what he calls “information insensi-
tive.” These are assets so safe that it is not profitable for
anyone to expend resources analyzing them for arbitrage
opportunities. As a result they should be impervious to large
price swings based on new information, safe for relatively
uninformed agents to hold, and very likely to remain liquid.
Many types of securitized debt, including those used as
collateral, met the definition of information insensitivity.
Much of the debt was deemed by rating agencies to be near
riskless. The chain of mortgage securitization in some cases
was prohibitively complex or literally impossible to trace,
Gorton argues, which raises the cost of gathering informa-
tion about the risk. High ratings and the expectation that
the asset’s value was not vulnerable to new information may
have made these assets ideal as a form of collateral. 
But investors can become unwilling to hold those instru-
ments of collateral when it suddenly becomes profitable for
the market at large to produce information on them — for
example, when significant, previously unknown exposures
to subprime losses become apparent and there are poten-
tially large mispricings to trade on. When this took place,
repo lenders withdrew their investments rather than launch
the costly infrastructure that would be required to assess the
collateral’s value on an ongoing basis. In a blackout it is too
late for everyone to become an electrician, Gorton says. 
Repo investors arguably didn’t place a high probability on
this outcome for a number of reasons. The borrowers were
major broker-dealers like investment banks that had no
interest in defaulting (and may have been perceived as
implicitly backed by government liquidity in the event of
failure, an expectation which would turn out to be true). So
the risk of ever taking ownership of the collateral may have
seemed small. Even if borrowers defaulted, much of the col-
lateral was ultimately based on house prices, which had
never declined on a national scale.
Despite the unexpected outcome, it hardly makes sense
for everyone to become an electrician in the future, Gorton
says. Rather, he supports a proposal that has been floated in
the wake of previous financial disturbances, that of “narrow
banking.” Only a heavily regulated and restricted set of
banks would be allowed to purchase securitized assets. They
in essence would manufacture safe collateral for the shadow
system to use, again, as currency in the market for funds.
Effectively, the government would determine which securi-
ties are eligible to be used as collateral, verify their safety,
and provide liquidity via the Fed’s discount window in the
event of panic. This safe supply of collateral would have the
potential to prevent future runs in shadow banking, though
it would also necessarily limit the supply (raise the cost) of
maturity transformation services of banking and shadow
banking.
Morgan Ricks offers an alternative solution. As suggested
by the Diamond-Dybvig model, Ricks proposes to extend
deposit insurance to the creditors of any entity that engages
in maturity transformation, or the type of “borrowing short
to lend long” that got many institutions into a funding bind
during the crisis. If one thinks of repo and other loans as
deposits in the shadow banking system, his proposal means
the government would have to decide which deposits are
funding “safe enough” investments. Then it would prohibit
maturity transformation outside that circle — effectively, it
would prohibit banking from taking place in the shadows.
Insurance would come with regulation, activity restrictions,
and, he argues, fees that would pay for it all, minimizing the
exposure of taxpayers.
Would deposit insurance weaken market discipline in
shadow banking, as it potentially does in commercial bank-
ing? Ricks says no, because market discipline is something
of a myth in these markets. Just as the Diamond-Dybvig
model predicts, to the extent that it is possible for nonfun-
damentals-based information to trigger a run — such as
rumors of insolvency rather than actual insolvency — credi-
tors will be oriented not toward business fundamentals but
toward whether a firm’s other providers of liquidity are stay-
ing in the game. During a panic, even if a short-term creditor
has done its homework and is convinced of a firm’s financial
strength, the only rational move is to step away, Ricks says.
Banking by Any Other Name
Both plans require a clear stance by the government on what
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line between staving off panics and providing incentive for
individual institutions to take and spread risk. That’s why
the devil is in the details with any proposal that involves gov-
ernment support.
“What you really want to do is prevent bank runs when
it’s truly a systemic panic, but not when it’s because of the
fault of the bank itself. You want a bank to face the full costs
of any stupid thing it does on its own,” said University of
Chicago economist Raghuram Rajan in a December 2009
interview with the Minneapolis Fed. Rajan has been 
credited with sounding an early warning of the system’s
potential instability at a Federal Reserve conference in 2005.
The trouble, Rajan says, is that these instances overlap
when competition and perhaps moral hazard cause banks to
herd together in risky behavior. Then the run is both sys-
temic and a result of individual choices that turn out to be ill
advised. 
Though economists and other onlookers have different
views on where and how the safety net boundaries should be
drawn, nearly all agree that a safety net with ambiguous bor-
ders is the least desirable of all possible scenarios. The
country saw this unfold in dramatic fashion as Bear Stearns
was rescued and Lehman Brothers allowed to fail. Many
believe the government’s decision to let Lehman fail set off
a new wave of uncertainty over which counterparties would
actually be given assistance. 
You can’t have it both ways, according to Ricks. There is
a fundamental trade-off between market discipline and sta-
bility. Trying to have both — by having a safety net, but one
whose boundaries were vague — nurtured an environment
for unpriced risks to spread.
But drawing lines is not easy when activities vary widely,
even among like types of institutions. Given the modern,
complex financial system, regulators are increasingly called
upon to regulate by function. “If it looks like a bank, and
smells like a bank, it is functionally a bank,” says Ricks.
“Repo is not an institution, it’s a market, a type of instru-
ment, a type of funding source.” 
Regulation almost always shrinks the banking industry
and thus the availability of credit to the economy, Gorton
says. Trying to regulate a shockless system into existence
would also stymie economic activity. Even if that weren’t an
issue, regulators have a limited ability to quash risk. The
more you penalize the risks we are aware of, the more you
encourage the risks that are hidden from view. 
“Any time your system is dependent on the regulators
outsmarting the bankers, the bankers will win,” Gorton
adds. The problem with most of the recent efforts at finan-
cial reform is they “just want to impose more and more
regulations on these firms and that’s just going to move the
banking system somewhere else.” An important lesson from
the crisis is that risky behavior will almost always move to
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That depends on how one defines “shadow banking.” Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010)
define the sector as bank-like activity not backed by explicit government support before the
financial crisis. The components included by the authors in that definition, displayed here, make
clear that the sector easily eclipses the traditional banking sector in total liabilities. Some
researchers, like Gary Gorton of Yale, estimate the sector is even larger if one includes other 
private transactions like bilateral repurchase agreements (bilateral repos), which were never
properly measured.
NOTE: Original chart created by Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010), replicated here by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond. Shadow banking liabilities excludes those held as assets by commercial banks.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data
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